TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/012191/01210110.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 8.3 KB | 166 lines

                                                                                THE GULF, Page 42

Israel in the Target Zone


If Saddam attacks the Jewish state, Bush hopes Jerusalem will
let the U.S. strike back and keep the coalition united

By JON D. HULL/JERUSALEM -- With reporting by Ron Ben-Yishai/Tel
Aviv and Dan Goodgame/Washington


    Just after 10 p.m. local time, phones rang, beepers went off
and dinner parties were interrupted by aides handing messages
to senior Israeli officials. Secretary of State James Baker had
just emerged from his meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq
Aziz in Geneva and announced that the talks had failed. That
was good news to members of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's
government, who dreaded a deal linking the gulf crisis with
Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. But their sense
of relief did not last long. Appearing before reporters about
an hour later, Aziz was asked whether Iraq would respond to a
U.S. attack by striking Israel. His chilling reply: "Yes,
absolutely, yes."

    Despite the Shamir government's efforts to maintain a low
profile throughout the crisis, Saddam Hussein once again
succeeded in yanking Israel back to center stage. Only this
time, Israel responded by ending its game of hide-and-seek and
adopting very public preparations for striking back. "Our
pilots are in their cockpits," declared air-force commander
Avihu Bin-Nun on state-owned television as he stood in front
of a fully armed F-15 equipped with external fuel tanks for the
more than 500-mile trip to Baghdad.

    Aziz's words unnerved U.S. officials, who realize that
Iraq's threats contain a brutal logic. If Saddam can strike
even a limited blow against Israel, he may be able to recast
the gulf conflict into an Arab-Israeli war, forcing some of
Washington's Arab allies to abandon the coalition and perhaps
even compelling Syria to switch sides. That gamble must have
seemed all the more tempting last Wednesday, when President
Hosni Mubarak was quoted as warning that Egypt would reassess
its position if Israel became involved -- though he conceded
later that "Israel has a right to defend itself."

    Despite Iraq's rhetoric, its forces are incapable of dealing
a devastating blow to Israel. Israeli fighter pilots should be
able to shoot down most, if not all, incoming Iraqi jets before
they reach the country's borders. Jerusalem calculates,
however, that Baghdad would be able to fire 10 to 20 of its
modified Scud B missiles before Israeli or U.S. warplanes
destroyed the launching bases in western Iraq. And Israeli
defense planners consider Iraq's Sukhoi-24 long-range bombers
an even greater threat than the Scud B missiles, which are
notoriously inaccurate. Iraq is believed to have 25 of the
advanced Soviet-made warplanes, which can make the round trip
to Tel Aviv without refueling and which boast terrain-hugging
radar. If even a single SU-24 slips through Israel's defenses,
it can deliver a seven-ton payload with pinpoint accuracy. By
comparison, each stripped-down Scud can pack only 662 lbs. of
conventional explosives or 331 lbs. of chemical weapons.

    Aziz was careful to qualify his latest threat, vowing to
strike Israel only if his nation is first attacked by the
U.S.-led forces. His statement may have been disingenuous. If
Saddam truly intends to embroil Jerusalem in the conflict,
he'll have to use his weapons before they are destroyed on the
ground by a massive U.S. air strike.

    Eager to keep Israel on the sidelines, Washington has put
intense pressure on Shamir to prevent him from launching either
a pre-emptive or a retaliatory strike, holding out the prospect
of increased economic and military aid as well as intelligence
sharing. During a meeting with Shamir in Washington last month,
President Bush pressed the point but failed to get a firm
commitment. Says a senior U.S. official: "You never really know
what the Israelis are going to do until they do it."

    For now, Israel is unlikely to hit first, judging that the
political fallout would outweigh the military benefits. If the
U.S. detects that the Iraqis are fueling and preparing missiles
aimed at Israel, a process that takes five to seven hours, it
will probably try to destroy the launchers. But if Jerusalem
detects signs of an Iraqi strike, Shamir may be impossible to
restrain.

    Washington has already volunteered to retaliate on behalf
of Israel if it is attacked. Surprisingly, even a number of
Israeli military experts, including former Defense Minister
Yitzhak Rabin, have suggested that Israel should think twice
before responding to an Iraqi assault if the damage is light.
But Foreign Minister David Levy sternly rejected that advice
last week. "Israel is not cannon fodder," he warned, and
"cannot allow itself to be attacked without responding, just to
preserve some coalition which is following the U.S."

    As a matter of principle, any Israeli retaliation is certain
to be far more punishing than the damage caused by an Iraqi
attack. The degree will depend on the number of Israeli
casualties and whether Iraq uses chemical weapons. If an Iraqi
strike is largely symbolic, causing little or no damage,
Jerusalem is expected to calibrate its response accordingly,
hitting a few select targets, including the missile bases in
western Iraq. Or it may acquiesce to pressure from Washington
and let the U.S. do the job.

    If Baghdad kills dozens of Israelis with conventional
warheads or drops even a single chemical weapon on the Jewish
state, Israeli leaders vow that the response will be
devastating, even if Shamir has to defy Bush. Within hours, say
military officials, dozens of key military installations in
Iraq, including chemical, biological and nuclear facilities,
would be in flames.

    That task won't be so simple. Once Israeli jets head for
Iraq, they must coordinate with U.S. forces or risk being
misidentified as enemy planes when they head back from Iraq.
But Israeli and American military sources deny speculation that
a joint strategy exists, and complain that communications are
dangerously inadequate. But Israel is reluctant to disclose its
war strategy for fear that the Pentagon will attempt to veto
its plans. And Washington refuses to provide greater access to
U.S. electronic-surveillance intelligence, concerned that the
information might encourage the Israelis to strike Iraq.
Although Shamir and Bush talked twice by phone last week,
Shamir says "more coordination" is necessary. Other Israeli
officials privately warn of a potential disaster once the
region's radar screens fill up with blips heading for Iraq.

    Even a minor air war between Israel and Iraq would send
shock waves throughout the Arab world, where public opinion
instinctively backs any attack on Israel. But if Israel acts
with restraint and in self-defense, U.S. officials believe they
can hold together the delicate Arab alliance. A large-scale
Israeli counterattack, however, could ignite a second war in
the region. An Iraqi-Israeli battle, for example, would entail
massive violations of Jordanian airspace, confronting King
Hussein with a critical dilemma. Diplomatic sources say Jordan
and Israel have held secret contacts to clarify their
positions. Israeli officials, who are acutely aware that any
confrontation with Jordan could prompt Syrian intervention,
stress that Israel will strike Jordanian air defenses only if
Israeli planes are first attacked by King Hussein's jets. For
now, Israeli strategists assume that King Hussein will lie low.
Given the sympathy for Iraq among Jordanians, that might not
be easy.

    None of these dangers have shaken the Israeli government's
conviction that a military solution to the gulf crisis is far
preferable to a diplomatic deal. As Israeli TV broadcast
civil-defense advisories and the army ordered a partial
mobilization of reservists last week, Shamir continued to sound
upbeat about the prospects for battle. "If a war begins
tomorrow and if it lasts just a few days, everybody will be
happy," he said. Even under those circumstances, however,
Shamir's joy may be short-lived: once the conflict with Iraq is
settled, the U.S. is certain to increase pressure on Israel to
work out a compromise with the Palestinians.